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Appendix
Descriptive Statistics
Table 1: Descriptive statistics of the variables. Sources: (1) World Trade Organiza-
tion, the Tuck Trade Agreements Database, and the McGill Faculty of Law Prefer-
ential Trade Agreements Database; (2) World Bank - Quality of Institutions Dataset
(Kaufman, 2006) - (3) Energy Information Administration - International Energy
Annual (Shackman, 2005) and IMF dataset (2005); (4) CEPII dataset (2005); (5)
COW dataset; (6) Freedom House Dataset (2006); (7) WTO website; (8) Horn and
Mavroidis dataset (2006); (9) Economic Freedom Word index (2007); (10) Compiled
by the author.
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Number of Obs. Source
PTA Dummy 0.08 0.27 2146 (1)
PTA Flexibility 1 0.36 0.14 175 (10)
PTA Flexibility 2 0.46 0.13 175 (10)
Corruption 2.13 0.65 2146 (2)
Rule of Law 2.12 0.68 2146 (2)
Govern. Effect. 2.14 0.65 2146 (2)
Trade 11.90 3.60 2146 (4)
GDP Growth 2.77 7.36 2146 (3)
GDPpc 2.53 4.02 2146 (3)
GDP 2.33 1.53 2146 (3)
Democracy 4.26 2.04 2146 (6)
Alliance 0.05 0.21 2146 (5)
GATT/WTO 0.60 0.49 2146 (7)
French Colony 0.17 0.38 2146 (4)
Other-Than-French Colony 0.55 0.50 2146 (4)
Distance 8.56 0.64 2146 (4)
US PTA 0.02 0.12 2146 (10)
Spatial PTA 0.01 0.008 2146 (1) (4) (10)
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PTA Flexibility I: Operationalization
The number of provisions, Pi, in treaties is given by the number of their articles (in-
cluding annexes). Thus, unlike Franchino (2004), numbered paragraphs, subpara-
graphs, and indents are not counted. There are two main reasons for this decision.
First, this action eliminates several discretionary decisions, since distinguishing a
part of an article is more difficult in the case of a PTA than it is in the case of a
piece of EU legislation. Second, as the table below shows, there is a good variation
in the number of articles across PTAs. The definition of a discretionary provision,
Di, is any provision that gives to the trade partner of the EU the authority to tem-
porarily suspend compliance with a specific PTA article. Note: if in the same article
two different sentences contain a discretionary provision, they are counted twice in
the index Di. Examples of flexibility include:
• Exceptional macroeconomical or financial circumstances
• Exceptional measures of limited duration
• Serious difficulties that produces social problems
• Serious balance of payment difficulties
• Serious internal circumstances affecting “law and order”
• Serious international tension
• Safeguard measures for infant industries
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Table 2 provides more details for each PTA signed by the EU with an LDC.
Table 2: List of PTAs between the EU and LDCs included in the analysis and
Flexibility Index.
Country No. Discret. Provis. No. Art. Annexes FI1
Bulgaria 34 125 Yes 0.27
Chile 33 206 No 0.16
Croatia 39 52 No 0.56
Czech Republic 34 124 Yes 0.27
Estonia 30 50 No 0.60
Hungary 40 124 Yes 0.32
Israel 32 85 Yes 0.38
Jordan 34 159 No 0.21
Latvia 28 51 No 0.55
Lebanon 21 42 No 0.50
Lithuania 29 52 No 0.56
Macedonia 34 128 No 0.27
Mexico 31 50 No 0.62
Morocco 39 156 Yes 0.25
Poland 34 122 No 0.28
Romania 35 126 No 0.28
Slovakia 33 124 No 0.27
Slovenia 32 51 No 0.63
Tunisia 42 156 Yes 0.27
Turkey 18 65 No 0.28
South Africa 31 109 No 0.28
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PTA Flexibility II: Operationalization





Table 3: List of PTAs between the EU and LDCs included in the analysis and
Safeguard Clauses. Note: * financial sector; ** steel industry; † agricultural sector;
‡ IPR
Country Social Economic Single Product Infant Indust. Specific Sect.
Algeria yes yes yes yes no
Bulgaria yes yes no no no
Chile no no yes no yes*
Croatia no yes yes no no
Czech Republic yes yes yes no no
Egypt no yes no no no
Estonia yes yes yes no no
Hungary yes yes yes no yes**
Israel no yes yes no yes†
Jordan yes yes yes yes no
Latvia yes yes yes no no
Lebanon yes no yes no no
Lithuania yes yes yes no no
Macedonia yes yes no no no
Mexico no yes yes no yes‡
Morocco no yes yes yes no
Poland yes yes yes no no
Romania yes yes yes no no
Slovakia yes yes yes no no
Slovenia yes yes yes no no
Tunisia yes yes no yes no
Turkey no yes no yes no
South Africa yes no no no no
Where SC is safeguard clauses, ADP is anti-dumping provisions, and 9 is given by
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Table 4: List of PTAs between the EU and LDCs included in the analysis and Anti-
dumping, Countervailing, and Subsidies Provisions. Note: * art. 36.2; ** art. 36.2;
† art. 37.2; ‡ art. 28.3b
Country AD - General AD - Specific Countervailing Subsidies
Algeria yes no no no
Bulgaria yes no no no
Chile yes no yes yes
Croatia yes no no yes
Czech Republic yes no no no
Egypt no no no no
Estonia yes yes* no no
Hungary yes no no no
Israel yes no no no
Jordan yes no no no
Latvia yes yes** no no
Lebanon yes no yes no
Lithuania yes yes† no no
Macedonia yes no no no
Mexico yes no yes yes
Morocco yes no no no
Poland yes no no no
Romania yes no no no
Slovakia yes no no no
Slovenia yes yes‡ no no
Tunisia yes no no no
Turkey yes no no yes
South Africa yes no yes yes
the maximum value of sum between SC and ADP. Regarding the safeguard clauses,
the index SC is the result of the following characteristics, i.e. if the provision is
included, the value of the index augment by 1 and 0 otherwise:
• Do safeguard clauses cover serious social difficulties?
• Do safeguard clauses cover serious economic difficulties?
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Table 5: List of PTAs between the EU and LDCs included in the analysis and
Flexibility Index 2.
Country SC ADP FI2
Algeria 4 1 0.6
Bulgaria 2 1 0.3
Chile 2 3 0.6
Croatia 2 2 0.4
Czech Republic 3 1 0.4
Egypt 1 0 0.1
Estonia 3 2 0.6
Hungary 4 1 0.6
Israel 3 1 0.4
Jordan 4 1 0.6
Latvia 3 2 0.6
Lebanon 2 2 0.4
Lithuania 3 2 0.6
Macedonia 2 1 0.3
Mexico 3 3 0.7
Morocco 3 1 0.4
Poland 3 1 0.4
Romania 3 1 0.4
Slovakia 3 1 0.4
Slovenia 3 2 0.5
Tunisia 3 1 0.4
Turkey 2 2 0.4
South Africa 1 3 0.4
• Do safeguard clauses cover serious difficulties related to specific product?
• Do safeguard clauses cover serious difficulties related to infant industries?
• Do safeguard clauses cover serious difficulties related to specific sectors?
Regarding anti-dumping provisions, the index ACP is the result of the following
characteristics, i.e. if the provision is included, the value of the index increases by
1 and 0 otherwise:
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• Do general provisions allow retaliation in the case of dumping?
• Do specific provisions allow retaliation in the case of dumping?
• Do provisions allow the use of countervailing duties?
• Do provisions allow retaliation in the case of subsidies?
Table 3, Table 4, and Table 5 above summarize the results of the manual coding.
Robustness Checks
To check the robustness of the empirical results, a series of changes to the base
models were made. First, and most importantly, the theoretical nexus between
transparency and PTA formation may be hampered by endogeneity and, as a result,
so may the relationship between transparency and flexibility. Specifically, since EU
conditionality implies the implementation of good-governance policies, it may be
expected that LDCs’ transparency increases as a result of these virtuous reforms
suggested by the EU.
Following Baier and Bergstrand (2004), I delete the time-dimensional informa-
tion and run a pure cross-section of both selection equation and outcome equation.
To ensure predetermined values, I use the earliest data on time-varying variables
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available, namely from 1990.1 Moreover, I use a different operationalization of
transparency. Following the suggestion of Rosendorff and Vreeland (2008), I use
missing data on standard economic and social indicators as indicators of trans-
parency. Namely, I evaluate 54 data series from the World Development Indicators
such as balance of payments, government finance, social indicators and trade.2 My
resulting transparency indicator shows the share of series for which there is data
available in a given country in 1990, i.e. the higher the value, the more transparent
the country.3 Due to a low number of observations, the Heckmam model does not
converge in the cross-section analysis. Thus, I estimate the outcome equation using
a Tobit model and the selection equation using a probit regression. Table 6, Table
7, and Table 8 show that both hypotheses hold also in the case of a cross-section
analysis, i.e. Transparency and Corruption are statistically significant in both mod-
els and have a positive sign.4 Moreover the impact of transparency and corruption
on the formation and design of PTAs is remarkable. For instance, moving from
the minimal value to the maximum value and holding the other variables at their
average value, the probability of forming a PTA increases by respectively 74 (37,
96) per cent and 62 (20, 93) per cent.
Second, I estimate the models using a direct dyads dataset. Third, I include
1A cross-section analysis also ensures that results are not spurious. The possibility of correlated
errors is not trivial in this case since both the likelihood of forming a PTA and the level of
transparency increase over time.
2The WDI is available at http : //worldbank.org/data.
3The average values of this variable is 0.63 and its standard deviation is 0.16.
4Results do not change if I use Rule of Law or Government Effectiveness instead of corruption.
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Table 6: The formation of preferential trade agreements, Probit Model. Standard
errors are in parentheses. ** significant at 1 per cent, * significant at 5 per cent, †
significant at 10 per cent.
Covariates Model 7 Model 8
Transparency 9.47** (2.80) -
Corruption - 1.28** (0.41)
GDP 0.33* (0.14) 0.41** (0.16)
GDPpc -0.04 (0.11) -0.06 (0.04)
Alliance 0.19 (0.53) 0.31 (0.83)
Democracy -0.07 (0.10) -0.10 (0.09)
Trade -0.002 (0.04) 0.04 (0.06)
Distance -1.93* (0.31) -1.91** (0.28)
Costant 7.93** (2.74) 10.90** (2.28)
Number of Observations 138 138
Pseudo R2 0.70 0.60
Table 7: Flexibility and Transparency, Tobit Model - PTA Flexibility 1. Standard
errors are in parentheses. ** significant at 1 per cent, * significant at 5 per cent, †
significant at 10 per cent.
Covariates Model 9 Model 10
Transparency 2.01** (0.50) -
Corruption - 0.26** (0.08)
Colony -0.39** (0.11) -0.30** (0.11)
GDP Growth -0.01* (0.005) -0.008 (0.005)
Trade 0.01 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01)
US PTA 0.61** (0.12) 0.84** (0.15)
Democracy -0.01 (0.03) -0.03 (0.03)
GDP 0.05 (0.03) 0.10* (0.04)
Constant -1.67** (0.41) -0.97** (0.34)
σ 0.34** (0.06) 0.41** (0.05)
Number of Observations 138 138
Uncens. Obs. 24 24
Pseudo R2 0.46 0.31
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Table 8: Flexibility and Transparency, Tobit Model - PTA Flexibility 2. Standard
errors are in parentheses. ** significant at 1 per cent, * significant at 5 per cent, †
significant at 10 per cent.
Covariates Model 11 Model 12
Transparency 3.40** (0.67) -
Corruption - 0.42** (0.10)
Colony -0.42** (0.14) -0.35* (0.14)
GDP Growth -0.01* (0.006) -0.01† (0.007)
Trade 0.03* (0.01) 0.01 (0.02)
US PTA 0.66** (0.16) 1.04** (0.19)
Democracy -0.03 (0.03) -0.07† (0.03)
GDP 0.04 (0.04) 0.12* (0.05)
Constant -2.81** (0.59) -1.43** (0.46)
σ 0.41** (0.07) 0.51** (0.07)
Number of Observations 138 138
Uncens. Obs. 24 24
Pseudo R2 0.50 0.33
year dummies and other control variables that were not included in the main model
to account for common external shocks, such as financial crises. Fourth, I drop
the variables that are not statistically significant in the main model. Finally, I
include some additional control variables that may affect the likelihood of forming
a preferential arrangement. GDPpci,t−1 measures the minimal value in terms of
GDP per capita of the LDC i year t − 1. This variable is a proxy for the level
of development of the selected country that is supposed to have a positive impact
on the probability of signing a PTA. Potential EU Candidatei scores 1 if an LDC
i is an EU potential candidate; 0 otherwise. Potential EU candidates, e.g. former
communist countries, often sign a bilateral trade agreement before joining the EU
a few years later. Trade Disputeij,t−1 scores 1 if the EU and an LDC was involved
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in a GATT/WTO trade dispute with each other at time t-1 and is 0 otherwise. In
the case of trade dispute, the probability of joining the same trade bloc is likely to
decrease. Landlockedi scores 1 if that LDC i is landlocked; 0 otherwise. Islandi scores
1 if that LDC i is an island; 0 otherwise. The last two variables control for the fact
that states without access to the sea and islands are more likely to form a PTA to
overcome their geographical disadvantages. Finally, I included Trade Opennessi,t−1
( trade
GDP
) for each LDC i at time t-1. The rationale is that LDCs, which are open
economically, face low adjustment costs from a PTA association with the EU.5 For
all these cases, the results are roughly comparable to those presented above and are
available upon request.
5This variable shows low correlation with transparency indicators.
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